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Draws on a 1990 postal survey of 1,011 life & physical scientists in NM & CO to analyze gender differences in the perception of nuclear risk. It is found that women scientists perceive significantly more risk from both nuclear power & waste & are less tolerant of imposing such risk than their male counterparts, even when age, training level, & attitudes toward technology are controlled. Life scientists perceive more risk from nuclear waste & technology in general than do physical scientists, an effect that is additive with gender. Potential explanations for the strong finding of male-female difference are sex differences in socialization, status, &/or biology. 5 Tables, 24 References. E. Blackwell

We examined the role of time and affect in intentions to purchase a risk‐protective measure (Studies 1 and 2) and explored participant abilities to factor time into the likelihood judgments that presumably underlie such intentions (Study 3). Participants worried more about losing their possessions and were more likely to purchase a protective measure given a longer term lease than a short‐term lease, but only if their belongings were described in affect‐poor terms. If described instead as being particularly special and affect‐rich, participants neglected time and were about equally likely to purchase a risk‐protective measure for shorter and longer term leases. However, and consistent with prior literature, the cognitive mechanism underlying this time‐neglect‐with‐affect‐richness effect seemed to be the greater use of the affect heuristic in the shorter term than the longer term. Study 2 results demonstrated that prior experience with having been burglarized amplified the interactive effect of time and affect. Greater deliberation did not attenuate this effect as hypothesized whether deliberation was measured through numeracy or manipulated through instructions. The results of Study 3 indicated that few participants are able to calculate correctly the risk numbers necessary to take time into account. Two possible solutions to encourage more purchases of protective measures in the long term are discussed.

We investigate the regional economic consequences of a hypothetical catastrophic event—attack via radiological dispersal device (RDD)—centered on the downtown Los Angeles area. We distinguish two routes via which such an event might affect regional economic activity: (i) reduction in effective resource supply (the resource loss effect) and (ii) shifts in the perceptions of economic agents (the behavioral effect). The resource loss effect relates to the physical destructiveness of the event, while the behavioral effect relates to changes in fear and risk perception. Both affect the size of the regional economy. RDD detonation causes little capital damage and few casualties, but generates substantial short‐run resource loss via business interruption. Changes in fear and risk perception increase the supply cost of resources to the affected region, while simultaneously reducing demand for goods produced in the region. We use results from a nationwide survey, tailored to our RDD scenario, to inform our model values for behavioral effects. Survey results, supplemented by findings from previous research on stigmatized asset values, suggest that in the region affected by the RDD, households may require higher wages, investors may require higher returns, and customers may require price discounts. We show that because behavioral effects may have lingering long‐term deleterious impacts on both the supply‐cost of resources to a region and willingness to pay for regional output, they can generate changes in regional gross domestic product (GDP) much greater than those generated by resource loss effects. Implications for policies that have the potential to mitigate these effects are discussed.

Political polarization impeded public support for policies to reduce the spread of COVID-19, much as polarization hinders responses to other contemporary challenges. Unlike previous theory and research that focused on the United States, the present research examined the effects of political elite cues and affective polarization on support for policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in seven countries (n = 12,955): Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Across countries, cues from political elites polarized public attitudes toward COVID-19 policies. Liberal and conservative respondents supported policies proposed by ingroup politicians and parties more than the same policies from outgroup politicians and parties. Respondents disliked, distrusted, and felt cold toward outgroup political elites, whereas they liked, trusted, and felt warm toward both ingroup political elites and nonpartisan experts. This affective polarization was correlated with policy support. These findings imply that policies from bipartisan coalitions and nonpartisan experts would be less polarizing, enjoying broader public support. Indeed, across countries, policies from bipartisan coalitions and experts were more widely supported. A follow-up experiment replicated these findings among US respondents considering international vaccine distribution policies. The polarizing effects of partisan elites and affective polarization emerged across nations that vary in cultures, ideologies, and political systems. Contrary to some propositions, the United States was not exceptionally polarized. Rather, these results suggest that polarizing processes emerged simply from categorizing people into political ingroups and outgroups. Political elites drive polarization globally, but nonpartisan experts can help resolve the conflicts that arise from it.